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Yahoo! was in the late nineties the most profitable and successful 
internet company on the web. However, after the burst of the 
dotcom bubble, its competitive position changed dramatically as the 
banner advertising format, the center of its advertising-based 
business model, entered in decline. This dissertation uses dynamic 
capabilities to explain the failure of Yahoo! to respond to that change 
in the environment. For that purpose, we develop and analyze in 
detail a teaching case covering Yahoo!’s history from 1994 to 2007. 
As we succeed to explain the failure of Yahoo! as caused by a low 
level of dynamic capabilities, we conclude that the company had a 
low propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely 
decisions and to make market-oriented decisions. We further identify 
problems in Yahoo!’s propensity to change its resource base that we 
classify as medium-low. Its low level of dynamic capabilities led 
Yahoo! to ignore the potential of search as a business and the 
emergence of keywords advertising as the dominant format of online 
advertising. Yahoo! reacted late and failed to transform its resource 
base in an effective manner to respond to those changes. These 
events still impact Yahoo!’s performance today.  
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The study of the dynamic capabilities framework aims to answer the fundamental 
question of how firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage (Teece et al. 1997), making it 
of the outmost importance in the field of strategic management. If brought from the academia 
to the everyday of businesses, this topic has potential to have a significant impact in business 
practices since the goal of achieving and sustaining competitive advantage must be the 
ultimate objective of any manager, in order to create value to his shareholder. 
The dynamic capabilities framework emerged both as an alternative and as a 
complement to the existing theories in strategic thinking like, for instance, the competitive 
forces approach from Porter, that focuses its analysis at the industry level and states that 
advantage comes from the deterrence of specific competitive forces, or the Resource Based 
Theory (RBT, formerly known as Resource Based View), that looks at the intrinsic 
characteristics of the resources and capabilities possessed by a firm as the source of its 
competitive advantage (Teece et al. 1997). The dynamic capabilities framework is centered on 
the idea that the ability to change its resources and capabilities is what gives a firm its 
competitive advantage, rather than the resources and capabilities themselves (Eisenhardt & 
Martin 2000; Teece 2007; Zahra et al. 2006). Sustained competitive advantage actually derives 
from a series of successive temporary competitive advantages (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000), and 
it is the ability to, when the environment changes, move from one advantage to the next that 
ensures long-term success. This means dynamic capabilities may be more valuable when the 
external environment of a firm changes rapidly or unpredictably, but that is not a necessary 
condition, making this concept valuable for all the firms (Zahra et al. 2006; Zollo & Winter 
2002). 
However, due to the novelty of the field, problems of “near-tautology” (Zollo & Winter 
2002) and even confusion between the concept itself and its effects (Zahra et al. 2006) arose. 
In an attempt to solve these problems, Barreto (2010) proposed a new definition for dynamic 
capabilities. Given that recent leap forward, this dissertation aims to provide an in-depth 
analysis of how that definition can be applied to a real world situation. For that purpose, a 
teaching case will be developed and analysed in detail. The development of teaching cases 
related to this subject is fundamental to ensure that it moves from the theoretical discussion 
to the practice, and to facilitate the transmission of knowledge to, in this case, students. 
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The company chosen to be analyzed was Yahoo! Inc. This dissertation will show how the 
company failed to cope with the dramatic changes the burst of the dotcom bubble brought to 
its online advertising business. The effects of that shock on Yahoo!’s competitive position can 
still be seen today. This company emerges as an interesting case also since the internet sector 
is a highly dynamic one that requires constant adaptation, and, therefore, is perfect to 
illustrate the impact dynamic capabilities can have on a firm.  
Following this introduction, a review of the existent literature is presented to 
theoretically frame the teaching case. The teaching case will come next, followed by the 
teaching note, a discussion and the conclusion. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. The need for dynamic capabilities 
The field of strategic management has been centered around three main paradigms: the 
competitive forces approach, the strategic conflict approach and a last group of approaches 
focused on building competitive advantage based on firm-level efficiency, like the RBT (Teece 
et al. 1997). 
In the first paradigm, the focus of the analysis is the industry. It is the behaviour of 
industry-level forces that determines the inherent profit potential of an industry or industry 
segment, and it is the eventual manipulation of those forces that allows firms to have 
sustainable competitive advantages. Rents are created at industry or segment level, being 
differences among firms explained primarily by scale (Teece et al. 1997). In the case of the 
strategic conflict approach, it relies heavily on game theory to analyze the competitive 
interactions between rivals, focusing on how a firm can influence the outcome of those 
interactions in its favour. However, by focusing too much on the interactions, it “ignores 
competition as a process involving the development, accumulation, combination, and 
protection of unique skills and capabilities”, insinuating that the success in the market place is 
the result of sophisticated plays and counter plays, when it is generally not the case (Teece et 
al. 1997). These two theories fail to consider the skills, know-how and path dependency effects 
of each firm (Teece et al. 1997). They fail to explain individual sources of sustainable 
competitive advantage, and furthermore fail to consider the need for that competitive 
advantage to be sustained over time. 
The last big paradigm focuses on internal factors to explain a firm’s success, considering 
each firm as a bundle of resources, and considering that resources are heterogeneously 
distributed across firms. It looks to the ownership of specific resources or capabilities as the 
mean to create competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; Teece 2007). Despite 
explaining the existence of competitive advantage at a given moment in time, it fails to explain 
how that advantage can be sustained when the environment changes (Teece et al. 1997; 
Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; Teece 2007). 
The dynamic capabilities concept emerged intrinsically emphasising two dimensions that 
these existing paradigms were missing: the capacity of a firm to change its resource base to 
achieve a fit with the changing external environment - suggested by the term “dynamic” - and 
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the key role that active strategic management has when making decisions to achieve that fit - 
suggested by the term “capabilities” (Teece et al. 1997). 
2.2. Definition and concept of dynamic capabilities 
The first proposed definition to the concept was the one from Teece et al. (1997), which 
states that dynamic capabilities are the “firms ability to integrate, build and reconfigure 
internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments”, opening the 
door to define the concept as an ability or capability. That lead was followed by Zahra et al. 
(2006) stating that dynamic capabilities are the “abilities to reconfigure a firm’s resources and 
routines in the manner envisioned and deemed appropriate by its principal decision-makers”, 
by Winter (2003), who defined dynamic capabilities as “those that operate to extend, modify 
or create ordinary capabilities”, and by Teece (2007) to whom “dynamic capabilities can be 
disaggregated into the capacity (a) to sense and shape opportunities and threats (b) to seize 
opportunities, and (c) to maintain competitiveness through enhancing, combining, protecting, 
and, when necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s intangible and tangible assets”. A 
second branch of the theory has defined dynamic capabilities as being processes or routines by 
saying they are “the firm’s processes that use resources – specifically the processes to 
integrate, reconfigure, gain, and release resources – to mach and even create market change. 
Dynamic capabilities thus are organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new 
resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and die” (Eisenhardt & Martin 
2000) or that “a dynamic capability is a learned and stable pattern of collective activity through 
which the organization systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit 
of improved effectiveness” (Zollo & Winter 2002). 
When defining dynamic capabilities the need to further distinguish those from other 
capabilities or processes operating within a firm emerged, forging the concept of dynamic 
capabilities in opposition to the concepts of: “operating routines”, which are the activities that 
maintain the operational functioning of a firm (Zollo & Winter 2002), “ordinary capabilities”, 
which are those exercised by a firm to survive in equilibrium where no change is needed 
(Winter 2003), or “substantive capabilities”  those that allow a firm to solve problems (Zahra et 
al. 2006). Instead, dynamic capabilities are the activities dedicated to the modification of 
operational routines (Zollo & Winter 2002), or the capabilities used to change the way a firm 
solves problems (Zahra et al. 2006). They are “higher level” routines that work to change the 
ordinary capabilities that lie at zero-level in the capabilities hierarchy (Winter 2003).  
Dynamic Capabilities                               
5 
 
Dynamic capabilities must have a systematic component. An organization that adapts in 
a creative but disjoint way to a succession of crises is not exercising a dynamic capability (Zollo 
& Winter 2002; Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). Without that systematic component, other 
mechanisms to achieve change exist like, for instance, “ad-hoc” problem solving (Winter 2003). 
Integrating past contributions, a new definition to the concept of dynamic capabilities 
was proposed by Barreto (2010) to whom “a dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to 
systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to 
make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base”. Here the 
concept is viewed as a multidimensional construct, referring to four distinct but related 
dimensions: the propensity to feel opportunities and threats, the propensity to make timely 
decisions, the propensity to make market-oriented decisions and the propensity to change the 
resource base. A dynamic capability is not a dichotomous notion but rather one that can be 
present in different degrees. No dimension alone can represent the concept but there is no 
requirement about the level of correlation about the dimensions (Barreto 2010). It is the level 
that a firm presents in each of the dimensions that allows the inference of its overall level of 
dynamic capabilities. 
2.3. Performance implications and means of action 
The concept of dynamic capabilities emerged to explain the existence of sustained 
competitive advantage (Teece et al. 1997; Teece 2007) and, in some definitions, the presence 
of dynamic capabilities is directly linked to the possession of that advantage. In the original 
definition of Teece (1997), dynamic capabilities imply success as they “reflect” an 
organization’s ability to achieve competitive advantage. Again, in 2007, Teece states that 
dynamic capabilities lie at the core of enterprise success and failure, reinforcing the direct link.  
However, that approach can be seen as tautological (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; Barreto 
2010) since the phenomenon the concept aims to explain is by definition included in the 
concept itself. It is, therefore, fundamental to define the concept independently of its possible 
outcomes (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; Barreto 2010; Zahra et al. 2006).. 
In line with that idea, a second line within the field saw dynamic capabilities as 
necessary but not sufficient conditions to competitive advantage and posited that their 
presence does not automatically guarantee organizational success or survival (Zahra et al. 
2006; Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; Barreto 2010). A firm can have a high level of dynamic 
capabilities but, without intentionally deciding to put them to use, these will not automatically 
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lead to a higher performance (Barreto 2010). Additionally, when used, they need to be well 
target and deployed to achieve strategic goals (Zahra et al. 2006) instead of other 
objectives that are irrelevant to a firm’s future. The position of Zollo & Winter (2002) is 
somehow less clear but seems to be in line with this view when they state that the absence of 
dynamic capabilities implies only transitory advantage. From there logically follows that a 
permanent competitive advantage implies the presence of dynamic capabilities, but not the 
opposite.  
Equally important to understand if dynamic capabilities lead directly to competitive 
advantage is to understand how they do it. It is the ability to change its resources and 
capabilities what gives the firm its sustainable competitive advantage, rather than the 
resources and capabilities themselves (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; Teece 2007; Zahra et al. 
2006; Barreto 2010). The contribution of dynamic capabilities to sustained competitive 
advantage is, therefore, indirect through resource manipulation (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). 
This contribution is set to be indirect since the functionality of dynamic capabilities can 
be duplicated across firms, which, according to the RBT requirements of inimitability and non 
substitutability, means that the dynamic capabilities can be sources of competitive advantage, 
but not of sustained competitive advantage. (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000) 
While some consider dynamic capabilities to be idiosyncratic due to the path 
dependence effects of each firm (Teece et al. 1997), dynamic capabilities can be considered 
idiosyncratic only in their details (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). Dynamic capabilities may present 
communalities across firms since there are always more or less effective ways of dealing with 
the problems faced and those problems will be, in their essence, common across companies 
(Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). This existence of communalities implies that managers that begin 
developing  a certain capability can start at different points, take unique paths and end up with 
capabilities that perform the same function (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). It also implies that the 
dynamic capabilities are relatively substitutable and fungible across firms (Eisenhardt & Martin 
2000). 
2.4. Relevant environments  
Regarding the environments where the dynamic capabilities framework can be applied, 
it is found both the opinion that it can only be applied to firms in environments with a high 
(Teece et al. 1997; Teece 2007) or at least moderate (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000) level of 
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change and that a dynamic environment is not a necessary component of dynamic capabilities 
(Zollo & Winter 2002; Zahra et al. 2006). 
Teece et al. (1997) have intrinsic to their definition that dynamic capabilities only apply 
to firms operating in environments with a high degree of change. Teece (2007) further details 
that the possession of dynamic capabilities is especially relevant in environments open to 
international commerce, exposed to rapid technological change and that present systemic 
technical change. These characteristics can be found specially in high tech sectors (Teece 2007).  
Despite stating that “dynamic capabilities consist of specific strategic and organizational 
processes (…) that create value for firms within dynamic markets”, Eisenhardt & Martin (2002) 
further divide those dynamic markets in moderately dynamic environments and high-velocity 
markets. To these authors, this distinction is relevant since different environments influence 
the way dynamic capabilities are built and its characteristics. In moderately dynamic 
environments, where change is predictable, dynamic capabilities resemble routines that lie on 
existing knowledge, whereas in high-velocity markets, where change is unpredictable, dynamic 
capabilities are simpler, relying on knowledge acquired as the environment changes.  
Nevertheless, even Zollo & Winter (2002) and Zahra et al. (2000) agree that, despite not 
exclusive to those environments, dynamic capabilities may be more valuable for firms within 
rapidly changing environments. 
2.5. Costs associated with dynamic capabilities 
One reason to say that dynamic capabilities might be more useful in rapidly changing 
environments lies in the costs of developing and maintaining those capabilities that may not 
yield enough return out of those environments (Zollo & Winter 2002; Zahra et al. 2006).  
Building and using dynamic capabilities is costly (Zahra et al. 2006; Winter 2003; Zollo & 
Winter 2002; Helfat & Winter 2011) and, typically, dynamic capabilities involve long-term 
commitments to specialized resources (Winter 2003). Therefore, it might be more 
advantageous to firms in less dynamic environments to sustain their competitive advantage by 
recurring to less costly processes of change (Zollo & Winter 2002; Zahra et al. 2006) that do 
not require maintenance and, therefore, only bring costs if used like, for instance, ad hoc 
problem solving (Winter 2003). In fact, the costs of maintaining and developing dynamic 
capabilities are another reason why dynamic capabilities might be present in a firm without 
leading to superior performance (Winter 2003). Dynamic capabilities only have a positive 
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implication in a firm’s performance if the costs of developing and maintaining those 
capabilities are inferior to the benefits that from them arise (Winter 2003). 
2.6. Dynamic capabilities development process 
Regarding their development, dynamic capabilities lie their foundations in the 
organization’s knowledge base (Zahra et al. 2006), which is in line with the idea that  
distinctive competences and capabilities generally cannot be acquired and must be built 
internally (Teece et al. 1997).  
The main mechanisms of creation and development of dynamic capabilities are practice, 
mistakes (by providing a greater motivation to learn) and the pacing of experience (which 
affects how easy it is to incorporate new experiences into the existent knowledge base of a 
company) (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). This learning that comes from past experience can be 
enhanced by having formal mechanisms associated with the learning process (Eisenhardt & 
Martin 2000; Zollo & Winter 2002). Examples of these, are the mechanisms of knowledge 
articulation, which alludes to the process through which individuals explicitly discuss the 
subjects at hand, and the mechanism of knowledge codification, which refers to the written 
documentation of acquired knowledge (Zollo & Winter 2002). 
The foundations and the development process of dynamic capabilities will be important 
to explain Yahoo!’s level of dynamic capabilities, as we will show on the discussion. For now, in 
the next section, we present the teaching case. The information in the case will allow us to 
evaluate the level of Yahoo! in each of the four dynamic capabilities’ dimensions and conclude 
about its overall level of dynamic capabilities, in the teaching note. 
  
Dynamic Capabilities                               
9 
 
3. Teaching Case 
Yahoo! – The End of the Banner Years  
In 1994, two Stanford students turned a hobby into a business that by 1998 was the 
most visited website on the planet, attracting up to 40 million pairs of eyeballs per month.1 
The Fortune magazine announced Yahoo! had won the search wars and was poised to much 
bigger things2, latter calling it one of the great success stories in the short commercial history 
of the Internet.3 At its high in January 2000, Yahoo! had a market value of more than $115 
billion and in the same year it would become, according to the Financial Times, the world’s 
most profitable internet company.4  By the end of 2007, it was worth only $30 billion, Fortune 
was now calling it the Internet’s most successful punching bag5 and its former place on the 
internet now belonged to a newcomer valued at $216 billion. At the beginning of 2012, Forbes 
declared Yahoo! was already dead6 and ready to become another internet artifact.7 What went 
wrong to cause such a dramatic shift? What opportunities did they miss and others saw? What 
wrong decisions did they take? 
“Yet Another Hierarchical Officious Oracle” 
It was 1994, September 22nd, 50 minutes past midnight when Jerry Yang, a Stanford 
Ph.D. student, 25 years-old, answered to a post placed on a webforum8 one day earlier. A user 
had asked if anyone could suggest “some good index pages with links to lots of other pages” 
and commented that “It’d be cool to have some kind of web yellow-pages” preferably 
searchable. He answered saying: “we have a pretty comprehensive listing at the Yahoo 
Database”, sent the link and added “it's an attempt to be organized by subject (although not 
very well) - but we are working on it... searchable too.” The other person Yang was referring to 
when he said “we” was his friend and colleague David Filo, 28 years-old, and Yahoo was a web 
directory they both had developed and were trying to spread the word about. 
That user’s request was not as silly as today it might sound. Back in that time the 
internet was quite a different place from what it is today. It was still in its infancy and was 
before anything else quite disorganized, with new webpages and content being created 
everyday but that were hard to find unless one knew the addresses. Feeling the same problem, 
Yang and Filo had started six months earlier, in their campus trailer, the “Jerry and David's 
Guide to the World Wide Web”. It was a list, made as a hobby, for the two colleagues to keep 
track of their personal interests on the web. Soon the list grew up and they started organizing 
it by categories and subcategories. Eventually they changed the name to “Yahoo” an acronym 
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of “Yet Another Hierarchical Officious Oracle” and because they liked the meaning of the word: 
“rude, unsophisticated, uncouth”. Their list became popular among friends and the word 
spread quickly.9 
In the fall of 1994, Yahoo celebrated its first million-hit day, translating to almost 100 
thousand unique visitors per day10. Yang and Filo realised they had something with business 
potential in their hands, dropped their Ph.D.’s and, in March 1995, Yahoo! Inc. was born (they 
were forced to add the exclamation point since just “Yahoo” was already taken). In April, they 
got initial financing in the amount of nearly $2 million from Sequoia Capital, a venture capital 
firm which had on its track record investments in Apple, Atari, Oracle and Cisco.11 
Everyone online 
Yahoo! was not alone in its quest to organize the information on the web. On one side, 
there were the directories – human organized lists of websites classified under categories and 
subcategories by editors – while, on the other, there were the search engines – automated 
indexes based on algorithms that automatically scouted the internet in an attempt to classify 
under subjects as many webpages as they could, using the words on the websites’ content as 
references. The other top search providers were Infoseek, Lycos and Excite, plus Netscape and 
AOL, a web browser and a proprietary online content network, which were also providing 
search services. New start-ups were born online every day wishing to reclaim a part of the web, 
and its value, to their own. It was a highly competitive environment. 
Finding information on the web was not a concern only for users – with new websites 
and companies constantly coming online, website owners wanted to be sure they could be 
found among the crowd. For that, they could advertise or, for free, give search providers a help: 
in addition to their own search for content to index, both directories and search engines would 
allow website’s owners to submit their websites for inclusion in their listings. That was a 
fundamental step for any new website. However, with hundreds of small search providers on 
the web, submitting websites for inclusion was cumbersome and time consuming. Each search 
provider would have its own submitting process and timing to deal with the requests, and, in 
the end, there wasn’t even the guarantee that the submission would be approved or that it 
would appear among the first search results.12 
Bringing in adult supervision 
In 1995, the Yahoo! family grew up when Tim Koogle, also a Stanford alumnus, was 
nominated by Yang and Filo to be the company’s President and CEO as they recognized they 
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had no business experience. On his turn, Koogle brought in Jeff Mallet to COO and Tim Brady 
to CMO.13 Koogle had previously worked at Motorola and had been CEO and President of 
several technology companies.14 The founders moved to the company’s board of directors. 
July was an important month for Yahoo! as it launched a new user interface, one that, 
for the first time, included advertising. Yahoo! was launching a three-month trial program 
during which five advertisers would pay $20.000 per month for rotating banners on its most 
popular pages, namely the sections “What's New”, “What's Cool” and “What's Popular”. 
Advertisers included MCI, Mastercard, Internet Shopping Network, NECX, and Worlds Inc.15 
“While advertising on the Internet is still unmeasured in its effectiveness, we think it is the 
avenue which will allow Web sites to turn into effective businesses”, Brady commented. 16 
Yahoo! went with advertising in alternative to subscriptions – they were committed to keep 
the website free for users. 17  Along with the advertising, Yahoo!’s first partnership would 
become visible – the website would from then on include news updates from Reuters New 
Media.18 By then, Yahoo! included more than 60.000 entries and got 1.000 user submissions 
for new ones per day, most of them from commercial websites.19  
By November, its trial advertising program was a success and they brought on board 
10 more advertisers which had among them AT&T, American Express, Bank of America, 
Citibank, Samsung and Honda.20  
Also in November, another major change happened for Yahoo! as they added a search 
engine to their website to complement its offer until then only directory based. From then on, 
if no results were found when searching the directory, results provided by its new partner, 
Open Text, would appear as a backup. Open Text was probably the most advanced search 
engine company to date since instead of crawling through just the first paragraphs of a web 
page when searching, it would scout every single word. The two companies saw that their 
offers combined would create the most powerful search tool available on the Internet.21  
Yahoo! had now more than 100.000 entries and allowed the search of millions of Web 
documents.22 
On April 12th 1996, Yahoo! Inc. went public at an issue price of $13 per share but it was 
such a hit that it closed the day at $33 - its performance was the second-biggest first-day gain 
ever for a Nasdaq stock to date. Yahoo! was not yet a profitable company but, in the year 
before, its revenues had been $1,36 million.23 At the end of June, Yahoo!’s market value was 
$551 million. 
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Soon after, branding emerged as a priority for Yahoo!. They started a successful 
marketing campaign to increase the value and awareness of its brand, including $5 million 
spent on TV ads.24 Yahoo! was written everywhere and becoming an established brand in the 
minds of consumers. 
The banner 
In 1996, the total annual online advertising spending was $267 million and growing.25 
The internet held the promise of highly targeted and effective marketing campaigns that 
would revolutionize advertising. The most popular form of advertising on the web was the 
banner. Usually about one inch by four or five inches and run across the top of a page, it 
invited the user to visit the advertiser’s page, by clicking on it.26  The ads shown on the banner 
could be always the same or could rotate and, as the banners size was becoming standard, 
they were starting to include animated images, videos, sounds, interactive forms or shockwave 
enhanced games that would claim to raise their click through rate – the number of times a 
user that sees the banner actually clicks on it.27 In the case of search providers, banners would 
usually be associated to specific search terms - an advertiser would pay a search provider to 
show its banner whenever a list of chosen words was run through search.28  
However, the promise wasn’t quite there yet. Banners were quite inefficient and the 
effectiveness of the internet as an advertising medium was strongly questioned, especially by 
traditional advertisers.  A spokesperson from Coca-Cola commented: “our interest will increase 
when there are more sophisticated ways to measure its effectiveness as a marketing tool”.  
“We are truly, truly in a research and development phase - we're learning what works, what 
doesn't, how to measure it. We don't know yet”, said on his turn a representative from Procter 
& Gamble.29 The click through rate of banner ads was between 2 to 3% when a banner was 
new, and would afterwards fall to below 1%.30 The value coming from banner ads was so 
relative and hard to measure that P&G told advertisers that it would only pay for banner ads 
on a CPC (cost-per-click) basis versus the CPM (cost per thousand impressions) that was 
common at the time.31 On a CPC basis the advertiser would only pay when the banner was 
actually clicked on, while with CPM every time the banner was shown counted as “an 
impression”. CPC banner ads were largely overpriced for their return,32 but, nevertheless, the 
demand kept increasing since more than 50% of the advertisers on the web were Internet 
start-ups that had freely available funds from their initial financing and weren’t raising 
questions.33   
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In 1996, Yahoo! was charging 2 to 5 dollar cents per search term per impression 
depending on the word’s popularity or $1.000 per month, per word34- advertisers on CPC basis 
were only 2 to 3% of its clients.35  A report covering the first-half of the year, found that the 
top 10 websites selling online advertising space were concentrating 66% of the revenue 
generated in the category. Search engines and directories accounted for 36% of the ad 
revenue, portals for 19%, computers and related interests websites for 18%, and news media 
for 11%.36  Data covering the year until November showed Netscape led the advertising 
business with revenues of $24,3 million, followed by Yahoo! with $16,5 million, Infoseek $16.3 
million, Lycos $10,9 million and Excite $10,7 million.37  
A revolutionary idea 
By 1996, an 18 years-old college drop-out named Scott Banister was working for 
Submit It! a start-up he had created in February 1995 and had became the most popular 
centralized submission service in the web.38 To simplify the process of submitting new 
websites to search providers, there were companies offering centralized submission services - 
instead of dealing with each search provider individually, an advertiser would go to a 
centralized submission company.39 
Banister’s start-up gave him a huge exposure to the wants and needs of advertisers 
and he could see how badly those wanted to ensure they got listed on the search provider’s 
results.40 That made him came up with an idea he called “Keywords”: to sell search listings 
based on pay-for-placement bidding.41 Banister saw that search results could be used to do 
advertising, merging advertising and search in one simple business. Search would be the future 
of advertising, showing people highly targeted ads when they were actively looking for related 
information instead of just passing-by. Banister never got to implement its vision but he did 
pitch it to several people in a few start-ups. The idea was out. 
In February 1998, a company called GoTo.com launched at the Technology, 
Entertainment & Design Conference a search engine its chairman and founder, Jim Gross, 
called revolutionary 42: at GoTo.com all search results were ranked based on how much 
websites were willing to bid to be listed, and advertisers would pay only if users effectively 
clicked the search results, on a CPC basis. Jim Gross was among the people Banister had told 
his idea to, and eventually decided to act on it. 43 
At the GoTo website, advertisers could register, choose and bid on a keyword, add a 
description to what would be their ad and submit it. After approval of the submitted keyword, 
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link and description, the ad would be added to Overture’s database. Every time a search for 
that keyword was triggered, the search results would be ranked from the website with the 
highest bid, at the top, to the unpaid sites at the bottom. To add transparency to the process, 
the price bided per click would be shown next to every result. Advertisers could at any time 
access their account and change the bid or the submission - they would be later billed for the 
service. 44  To improve future results, GoTo would also ask users to vote on the quality and 
relevance of search results and allow some editorial input.45 
Mr. Gross compared the offer of GoTo to other search websites saying “they make 
money when you stay - I make money when you leave. We're changing the alignment of the 
proposition”. “We really are a true search engine”, “what these guys have is traffic, but they 
don't have a good business model”, he said.46 “I am not saying other search engines are not 
pure in their results, but those search results are surrounded by very expensive ads which are 
really what search engine companies want you to click on” he added in another interview. 47 
Mr. Gross believed that a combination of market forces and user feedback was the best and 
most cost-effective way to provide better search results and that even non commercial 
websites would have interest in paying for users’ attention.48 “This filters out the junk. It also 
gives the little guy a chance to buy space without having to pony up exorbitant fees for banner 
ads”.49 
The Portal to success 
By 1998, Yahoo! had climbed its way to the top of the search providing business.50 It 
had more than twice the traffic of Excite and more than four times the one of Lycos.51 Its 
market value was now more than $2 billion. In November 1997, it had 25,4 million unique U.S. 
adult users per month and reached 63% of all U.S. adults using the Internet, having a larger 
audience than any other Web site or online service.52 Its success came from its editorial 
approach that provided users highly relevant results at a time where automated search still 
had flaws. Yahoo! didn’t want to enter the technological race to map the web’s content like its 
non-directory competitors were doing – Yahoo! should be about relevance, not quantity.53 If 
one would visit Excite or Lycos, he or she would see rows of expensive servers working to 
provide thousands of results in seconds. Yahoo!’s servers were pc’s run by a third party and at 
the core of its search was a team of editors.54 
Yahoo! had grown away from its search providing roots, offering a huge range of other 
features. Added mostly trough acquisitions and partnerships, it now offered services like free 
email, chat, yellow pages, classifieds, maps, calendar, a personalized entry page and sections 
Dynamic Capabilities                               
15 
 
dedicated to news, finance, sports, travels and kids.55 It was now the number one financial56 
and news source57 on the web and had agreements with Compaq and Gateway to be on their 
computers desktops as their featured directory provider. Geographically, it was now present in 
Japan, France, Germany, the UK, Ireland, Asia, Korea, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, Norway, Denmark and Sweden with regional directories.58 
Yahoo! had evolved to become a Portal. Search providers didn’t want to be search 
providers anymore; they wanted to be portals, hubs and gateways to the web’s content.59 
They didn’t want people to just pass by, they were trying to give users reasons to stay and, 
eventually, watch the banner ads they had based their business model on. Actually, since its 
business was based on selling advertising, Yahoo! had now a different vision of itself: “What 
Yahoo! had been from day one was a media company, in the context of the internet as a 
[broadcast] medium”, Koogle said in an interview.60 In the vision of Yang, Koogle and Mallet, 
Yahoo! should be a media company instead of a technology company – technology, was a 
commodity and they were better off with advertising.61 Yahoo! would be a content provider in 
this new communication medium that was the internet and draw its revenues from the 
opportunity to show ads to users viewing that content. Mallet said the secret to Yahoo!’s 
success so far had been “a laserlike focus on three areas: content, brand and distribution”.62 By 
then, only one out of three users would go to Yahoo! to search, the rest of the time they would 
go there to use other Yahoo! features like email, chat or Yahoo! Finance, said Yang in an 
interview, “we certainly are becoming more online service-like, but that doesn't make our 
navigation service any less important”.63 In 1997, Yahoo! had been the top ad-supported 
website on the web for the second consecutive year, generating $53,2 million in advertising up 
180% from $19 million in 1996.64. 
In March 1998, Yahoo! announced they would drop Altavista as their web search 
provider (they had previously dropped Open Text) and switched to a company called Inktomi 
mainly because Altavista had evolved from a search-only company and was now a competitor 
in advertising.65 
Revenue Loop 
They kept adding content and features to Yahoo! and eventually, in June 1998, Yahoo! 
acquired a company called Viaweb, an e-commerce hosting service, and turned it into Yahoo! 
Store, a platform for merchants wanting to do business online to set their websites.66 However, 
the interest on Viaweb had started moths before. 
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Viaweb was at that time developing the idea of a product search engine to maximize 
the revenue from their e-commerce platform to which they called Revenue Loop. The idea was 
that Revenue Loop would sort search results not in order of textual relevance (like ordinary 
search engines) nor in order of how much advertisers bid (as GoTo did) but in order of the bid 
value times the number of transactions of the product in question. 67 That would exclude from 
the top of the listing products with a high bid but that users never actually bought, improving 
the revenues of an online retailer earning on a CPC basis and improving the relevance of the 
search results for users. 
When Yang first met with Viaweb to check out the company in early 1998, already with 
the undisclosed intention to buy it, Paul Graham, one of the two Viawebs’ founders, thought 
they were meeting together because Yahoo! was interested in Revenue Loop and presented to 
him the whole concept.68 To Graham’s surprise, Yang didn’t seem to be interested in anything 
other than the platform itself: “I was confused. I was showing him technology that extracted 
the maximum value from search traffic, and he didn't care? I couldn't tell whether I was 
explaining it badly, or he was just very poker faced” he commented.69 The acquisition went 
forward, Graham ended up working at Yahoo! and Revenue Loop was never implemented.70  
As it turns out, it was probably not the first time Yang was hearing and saying no to an 
idea to improve Yahoo!’s search function. Before Revenue Loop, Banister’s idea had knocked 
on Yahoo!’s door, and Yahoo! also didn’t open: In addition to Jim Gross, Ali Partovi and other 
principals of LinkExchange (a start-up that had acquired Submit It!) were also among the ones 
that Banister had pitched Keywords. “[We] loved the idea, because we had the benefit of the 
right context. LinkExchange offered traffic-generating services to almost a million small 
website owners. Every day our customers emailed us, ‘Can you help my website get listed 
properly on Yahoo! search?’”, Ali Partovi remembers. They saw potential on Banister’s idea 
and went on to the big search providers to pitch it themselves, starting with the biggest, 
Yahoo!, in 1997. “We visited Yahoo! more than a dozen times to pitch the Keywords idea. (…) 
Despite repeated rejection, we pitched every member of Yahoo!’s executive team multiple 
times, each time finding new ways to present the concept and new data to support how 
profitable and huge the opportunity might be, all in vain”.71 
The reason Yahoo!, or any other major search provider, wasn’t interested neither in 
Revenue Loop nor in Keywords was that advertisers were still overpaying for banner ads, 
making banner advertising everyday more profitable. Internet start-ups were an easy money 
source and they didn’t need to look for it anywhere else. If advertisers were to start paying for 
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online advertising what it was really worth, Yahoo!’s revenues would have actually 
decreased.72  
Consolidating the audiences 
Back at Yahoo!, project managers were called “producers” and the different parts of 
the company were called “properties”. It was now more a media company than ever. 
Engineers, programmers and technical improvement were not central parts of the organization 
and the search function was just another feature on their Portal offer.73 In late 1998 or early 
1999, Graham, one of the Viaweb’s founders, that was still working at Yahoo!, told Filo they 
should buy a start-up called Google because he and Yahoo!’s other programmers were using it 
instead of Yahoo! for search. To his surprise, Filo answered that it wasn't worth worrying about 
since search was only 6% of Yahoo!’s traffic, and they were growing at 10% a month. To Filo 
search “wasn't worth doing better”. 74 
Google was a new search company, incorporated in 1998 but that had been operating 
for a few years75, which had a revolutionary algorithm that would assess the relevance of a 
search result not only in terms of matching the searched keywords with a website’s content 
but by considering how many links on the web would drive to that website, using a proprietary 
and unique technology called PageRank. This system allowed Google to increase dramatically 
the relevance of its search results in comparison with its rivals. Coincidently, Google was also 
an idea from two Stanford students. 
Yahoo! continued on its route and in January 1999 announced its intention to acquire 
Geocities, the Web's most popular and widely used user community at the time, by $3,56 
billion76 aiming to combine two of the Web's strongest brands and most heavily used 
services.77 In April, it bought Broadcast.com, the leading destination on the Web for audio and 
video broadcasts, in a deal valued at $5,7 billion78 that would provide “significant added value 
to Yahoo!'s audiences worldwide” said Tim Koogle79. The more users Yahoo! could attract, the 
better. 
Google strikes 
In April 1999, AltaVista followed GoTo.com and started auctioning keywords text ads 
to the highest bidder with the difference that paid placements would appear in a box 
separated from the “core” results. “This is a rare opportunity to deliver a very good user 
experience, while generating revenues” its CEO Rod Schrock commented, adding that Altavista 
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was taking the auction route to “give smaller businesses the opportunity to buy access to the 
site” rather than selling only through syndication firms.80 
While Banister’s vision was gaining traction, on January 3rd 2000, Yahoo!’s shares hit 
an all time high with the company reaching a record of more than $115 billion market value.  
Later that year it would become the world’s most profitable internet company.81 
In June, Yahoo! dropped Inktomi and licensed the search function in its portal to 
Google in part motivated by the quality of Google’s engine, in part to lower the costs in that 
area as Google was providing a cheaper service.82  Google had actually been calling Yahoo! for 
a partnership for months – to be the search provider of Yahoo! would bring them the visibility 
and reputation they needed to grow.83  
After been elected by consumers the number 1 search provider in the market two 
quarters in a row,84 Google would become in 2000 a direct competitor to Yahoo! in the 
advertising business when it joined GoTo.com and Altavista on the field of keyword search 
advertising with an advertising program they called Adwords.85 Google’s paid results would 
appear separated from non-paid results (like at AltaVista) and would be charged on a CPM 
basis, with rates varying from 1 to 1,5 dollar cents per impression, according to the position of 
the paid ads on the results page (top, side or bottom). It had the goal of being easy to use and 
was, unlike GoTo and Altavista’s, fully automated, allowing advertisers to set by themselves a 
campaign at the Adwords website without any need of revision or approval. Other features 
allowed advertisers to fine-tune ads in real time, to monitor ad statistics, track ads inventory 
and CPM daily estimates. 86 Google had made the bet of not using images, pop-ups, animations 
or flashing logos to keep its website “clutter-free” and focused on search87 an approach 
completely different from the other players and their Portals. 
In 2000, Microsoft, that was on the search business with MSN Search and had its own 
Portal, also did a brief incursion into the world of keywords advertising after Ali Partovi and his 
colleagues had been persuading its executives that it was a good opportunity (after 
LinkExchange was acquired by Microsoft). However, they ended up pulling that offer out of 
MSN Search when it started cannibalizing the revenues from banner ads.88 
The call back to earth 
Meanwhile, the dot.com bubble had burst and by the end of August 2000, Yahoo!’s 
stock started to fall sharply after a series of warnings by analysts concerned with the impact 
the cut on online advertising would have on the company. They were concerned over the 
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future of online advertising now that many of the internet start-ups were cutting their 
advertising budgets and the non-dotcom companies were not changing their advertising habits 
fast enough to compensate. 89 As the medium developed, traditional advertisers had finally 
started it invest online, but they were being cautious and their opinion about banners 
remained basically the same as in 1996. They were focusing their investments on their own 
websites and opting for advertising formats beyond the banner.90 Banners still had a part in 
the web’s marketing mix, but, after years of experimenting, now advertisers were fully aware 
about what the overpriced rectangles could and could not do91 – even the dotcom’s were 
rethinking their advertising strategies to include more cost-effective solutions now that they 
were forced to be rational with their money.92 Concerns from the market further increased 
when Yahoo! started to call advertisers in search for business, allowing the renegotiation of 
existing contracts and lowering their rates.93 By the end of September the company was worth 
only $50 billion.  
To convince investors of its good health Yahoo! disclosed in October, for the first time 
in its history, the composition of its advertising client base to say that 40% of its advertisers 
were “pure internet companies” down from 47% in the previous quarter, the number of 
advertisers had declined to 3.450 from 3.675, but that its average daily page views had been 
780 million in September, up from 680 million in June, the number of registered users was 185 
million, up from 155 and that the number of unique users had risen 6% from the quarter 
before. “The Yahoo! franchise is stronger today than never before”, said Koogle.94  
In January 2001, Yahoo! released a warning to investors saying that its profits would 
fall 10 to 30% that year, a colossal difference from the 34% growth analysts had expected.95 
“This will be a transition year as we move our customer base from pure play internet 
advertisers to more traditional advertisers” admitted Koogle. “There is a softening of the 
economy, but we can use that to take market share from our competitors. We have a powerful 
franchise, the internet's importance is increasing and the near-term effect of softening 
economy is just that - short-term”.96  But as the pressure over Yahoo! kept increasing, some 
analysts were worried the company’s problems could have deeper roots and were questioning 
Yahoo!’s ability to implement changes. “It is a very insular management team which believed 
that their way was the right way” comment an analyst from UBS.97 Internally, the confidence 
wasn’t higher. Executives had been criticizing Koogle’s consensus-style management for 
slowing down decision making at that time of crisis: before the executive meetings they would 
joke about whether they were about to enter to a “TK [Tim Koogle] meeting” or not; “we 
wanted to know if we were actually going to get anything done”, one remembered.98 
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In March, after a new announcement that the company would barely break-even and 
the suspension of Yahoo!’s shares, Tim Koogle stepped down as CEO, following the resignation 
of Fabiolo Arredondo (chief of the European operations), Mark Rubenstein (chief of the 
Canadian operations), Savio Cho (chief of Asian operations), and Jin Youm (chief of the South 
Korean operations) over the previous months.99 The shares sunk to a 52-week low.100 At the 
end of the month, Yahoo! was worth only $8,5 billion.  
The situation was particularly problematic since Yahoo! had been neglecting the needs 
of advertisers and the need to build long-term relationships with them – especially with the 
non-dotcom that were more reticent about investing online:  “We ran Yahoo! to optimize 
market share. I make no apologies for that”, “if there was a company that didn't get it 
[Internet advertising], we moved on very quickly”, Mallett said in an interview.101  Since their 
client base kept growing, Yahoo! was accustomed to charge the rates they wanted, cutting the 
deal, and moving on. Their sales team was difficult to deal with and some customers had been 
questioning their long term prospects for years.102  
Hollywood to the rescue 
On March 1st 2001, Terry Semel took over the place left empty by Koogle arriving 
directly from Hollywood – he had been the CEO of Warner Brothers for 20 years. Critics 
commented his lack of experience in advertising and technology but Yang replied: “Most 
people who look up Terry think of him as a movies guy, we see someone who has been 
involved in almost every conceivable model of the media business”.103 
Mr Semel would focus the company turnaround on two factors: selling more 
advertising to established companies and developing more fee-based services. He believed his 
experience would be enough to address those challenges: “Yahoo! is a media company, it 
doesn't matter if it's Batman, The Matrix or Yahoo! Finance. It needs to be the best, most fairly 
priced, best marketed brand to the consumer”, he commented.104 Yahoo!’s 44 business units 
were merged into 6.105 
To increase the revenue from fees, he would develop partnerships and joint ventures 
with companies that would provide Yahoo! with entertainment and information contents that 
it could sell. Mr Semel defined that the company's priorities would be in music, finance, sports 
and other areas of entertainment that would allow boosting their content portfolio and charge 
users for access.106 He wanted half of Yahoo!’s revenues to come from fees by 2004.107 At the 
Dynamic Capabilities                               
21 
 
end of the second quarter of 2001, advertising was the source of more than 80% of its 
revenues.108  
To turn around its shrinking advertising business Yahoo! would bet on new advertising 
formats that were larger and included interactive elements like streaming video. “We are at 
the cusp of creating a much better advertising medium that is more persuasive, more visible 
and more entertaining, and causes more people to click”, said Semel. Yahoo! had never done 
so by fear that users would not react well but he believed that wouldn’t be a problem drawing 
a comparison: “Why do people sit in theatres and watch a bunch of trailers?”, he asked 
“Because they enjoy it”.109 
At the beginning of 2002, Yahoo! had acquired and integrated Launch Media, which 
claimed to have the largest collection of music videos on the Web, and launched Yahoo! Music, 
where users could listen to songs online or download them for a fee from the Pressplay 
subscription service (a partnership). At Yahoo! Broadcast users could access the contents of 
400 radio stations and 70 TV stations across the U.S, all paid on demand.110  Auctions, personal 
ads and classifieds were now paid services.111 It acquired Hotjobs.com, an online employment 
platform, and was now charging employers and recruiters subscription fees.112 It positioned 
itself as an online-marketing partner for entertainment and media companies by making a deal 
with Sony to feature Sony Entertainment contents on its websites.113  
However, trying to convince people to pay for what so far had been free wasn’t easy 
especially when the contents Yahoo! was offering for pay were available for free elsewhere. 
Analysts estimated that only less than 10% of Yahoo! users would be willing to pay for 
content.114 
Google strikes again 
Another change had happened at Yahoo! when, in November 2001, it started 
displaying paid search results through a partnership with GoTo.com, in a 6-month trial deal.115 
The 5 first results from every search in its directory would be paid ads provided by GoTo – 
Yahoo! would receive a fee from GoTo to post the results. GoTo had recently changed its name 
to Overture Services and stopped promoting itself as a search provider to focus only on 
syndicating paid ads.116 Overture was now the dominant player in selling keywords advertising 
and was also syndicating paid placements to AOL, Lycos and Microsoft’s MSN.117 Paid listings 
were now a major trend as banners were in decline (See exhibit 1) and every major search 
engine was doing it.  
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In February 2002, Google introduced a second version of its Adwords program called 
Adwords Select. Google changed the system to a CPC auction system like Overture’s but 
introduced two important differences. One was the way ads were ranked not only by bid but 
by a combination of the click-through rate and the bid.118 The second one was the auction 
method, as Google started using an adaptation of a second-price auction system, where the 
highest bidder would not pay what he had bid, but the price of the second highest bid plus a 
penny.119 Google had created its own Revenue Loop – ads that weren’t clicked would be cut 
and revenue would be maximized.  
The similarity of this model with Overture’s led the latter to sue Google for patent 
infringement121 in a process that was afterwards settled in Overture’s favour out of the 
courts.122  Overture had reasons to 
feel threatened - Google had entered 
the deal of syndicating search ads 
and had already stolen one of 
Overture’s syndication contracts, 
one with Earthlink.123 Google was at 
the time a player with both its own 
search and advertising technology 
while most of the payers were 
subcontracting one or both these 
systems. (See figure 1) 
Better late than never? 
In April 2002, the time came for Yahoo! to decide on its trial contract with Overture 
and CEO Semel commented: “Search and paid listings are key growth areas for Yahoo!”. A 
contract was sign for the next 3 years.124 At this point the importance of the search business 
seemed evident for everyone. Search had truly become the future of online advertising 
Yahoo! continued with its strategy, adding a fee-based online gaming service to its 
offer and announcing that a partnership it had with SBC Communications would evolve to 
selling high-speed internet access.125 In June, they presented their first positive results since 
the bubble burst in the amount of $21 million, but the public continued apprehensive about 
whether these results could be sustained in the long term. Most of the company’s recovery 
was coming from HotJobs, which was losing market to the competition, and from the Overture 
deal. Also, industry spending on online advertising had climbed 1% in the first-half of 2002, yet 
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Yahoo!'s ad sales tumbled 14% in the same period.126 In September, Newsweek commented: 
“this bid to remake Yahoo! is nothing less than a superproduction. And a Hollywood ending is 
far from assured.”127 
In the summer of 2002, Semel tries to acquire Google with an offer of roughly $3 
billion but Google considered the value to be too low and refused.128 In April, Google had for 
the first time been announced as the leader in global websearch.129 By November, 41,3 million 
people were using Google in the U.S. compared with 40,6 million for Yahoo!'s search page.130 
Directories had been losing their ability to compete with automated search both in reach and 
quality,131 but, until October, Yahoo! was still using its directory as the as the primary source to 
its search results. That changed when it finally moved it to second place and started putting 
the automated search results, provided by Google, first.132  
As a plan B, in December Yahoo! acquires Inktomi for $235 million, paying a premium 
of 41% over the market price.133 “Yahoo!'s vast reach and its unmatched breadth and depth of 
services, combined with Inktomi's outstanding engineering expertise and leading search 
technology, will help us achieve our goal of providing users with the most comprehensive, 
relevant and highest quality search solutions on the Web”, said Semel.134 “There is a big 
difference between being a renter and an owner”, he continued “being less dependent on 
others to create the innovation for us is worth an awful lot of money to Yahoo!”.  In fact, 
Yahoo! had estimated that for every one percentage point that it was able to increase its 
market share in search, it would gain $20 million to $60 million a year in advertising 
revenue.135 Inktomi was at the time the search provider of Microsoft’s MSN. It was still in some 
financial trouble due to the bubble crash and to the newcomer Google superiority. It did not 
have its own website, living only from search syndication only and paid inclusion – two new 
revenue streams for Yahoo!.  
By March 2003, the environment among search 
engines was competitive. In the previous year, Overture had 
lead the keywords advertising business (see figure 2) and had 
just announced it would buy Altavista to gain control of its 
own search technology in order to better compete with 
Google – Google had recently stolen it biggest client AOL.137 
Following the latest innovation on keywords advertising called 
contextual advertising, Google was launching a new program called Adsense that would use 
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allowing anyone to become and advertising distributor. Google would manage the process, 
syndicate the ads, and make money.138 
In the first quarter of 2003, 19% of Yahoo!’s revenues were coming from its deal with 
Overture and the commercial search sector was predicted to grow from $2 billion by year-end 
to $5 billion by 2006.139  
In July, Yahoo! announced it would buy Overture for $1,63 billion. “By combining 
Overture's world class monetization platform and complementary web search assets with 
Yahoo!'s already robust search business, we will further improve our ability to offer the highest 
quality search experience”, said Semel140  
Curiously this move put Microsoft MSN in a strange position now that Yahoo! was in 
control of 2 of the 3 services that were providing its search functions. Yahoo! had now some of 
the best technologies available in the market related to search like Altavista, Inktomi, Overture 
and other companies that these companies had acquired themselves. “They are all really good, 
nice pieces for us to put together an entire framework of providing the best search experience 
to the user”, said its VP for engineering.141  
Social search 
By February 2004, more than one year after buying Inktomi, Yahoo! dropped Google as 
its search provider and presented its own algorithmic search engine incorporating Inktomi’s 
technology. It was based on a crawler they named Yahoo! Slurp.142 “Today's announcement 
marks the beginning of a rapid succession of innovations from Yahoo! Search that will deliver 
against our mission of providing the highest quality search experience on the Web” said the 
Senior VP for Yahoo! Search and Marketplace.143 Google had lost its largest licensing partner 
and specially the one that had given it more exposure to search users and had helped building 
its reputation but, in August 19th, it went public and without problems closed the month with a 
market cap of $28 billion. Yahoo! was then worth $38 billion. By the end of the year, only 13% 
of its revenues were coming from fees.144 
Now that Yahoo! had its own search technology, it went on a quest to develop its own 
advertising technology in a project they code-named “Project Panama”, integrating Overture’s 
technology – they started in March 2005.145 The sense of urgency in the project was obvious. 
When Semel and his CFO were asked to approve the initial project budget, their answer came 
back in 6 hours and was “Go figure what it takes and do it right”.146  Mr. Semel admitted they 
were starting late because Yahoo!’s search advertising system bought from Overture “was 
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performing well, and it took time for executives to realize just how much better Google’s 
system was”.147 Panama’s main goal was to make the ads more related to the search queries in 
order to receive more clicks and, therefore, more revenue and more advertisers.  
Now search was finally a priority; but Yahoo! had a unique vision of search in the long 
term – they saw the future on “marring search with the community” in what they called “social 
search”, an approach where searching for one piece of information would build on other 
people’s successes and failures to find the same information, within a community. 148 In the 
same way they once had wanted to stay away from fully automated search trusting on their 
editor build directory, they were again going back to people.149 The web was evolving to a 
place where users were every time more producers of contents rather than only consumers 
and Yahoo! wanted to take advantage of it. In 2005, they developed their own social network 
called Yahoo! 360° where users could share their blogs, photos, music and restaurant reviews, 
a search service called My Web 2.0 where users could save and tag their search results to later 
allow them to be searched by people in their network, acquired Flickr, a picture sharing 
platform, Delicious, a network where users could bookmark and share their interests on the 
web, and were developing Yahoo! Answers where users would post questions that would be 
answered by other users.150  
The turning point  
After tens of million dollars in costs, Yahoo! announced Panama’s launch to the 
summer of 2006.151 Yahoo! had lost considerable market share to Google in the last year. In 
March 2006, Google's share of the online searches in the United States rose to 43% of all 
searches from 36% in March 2005, while Yahoo!'s share declined from 30% to 28%, during the 
same period.152 An advisor that used to sit at  the executive meetings was not surprised: Yahoo! 
had a “relatively constipated process of reviewing anything”, it was slow, cumbersome and 
“not an entrepreneurial culture” mainly due to Mr. Semel’s “low-risk, non confrontational” 
profile, he pointed.  He particularly remembered a meeting where an engineer had asked how 
long the company would take from an idea to its execution – the answer was 8 months.153 
By July, Semel announced Panama would be late 3 months.154  The project was harder 
than expected; it created internal tensions with Overture structure that had not been fully 
integrated, Overture’s software was still working with human revision and had not been 
designed to work on a global scale.155 Before the third trimester’s performance was presented, 
Mr. Semel warned investors that the growth of internet advertising had fallen short of 
Yahoo! – The End of the Banner Years 
26 
 
Yahoo!’s predictions and earnings would be on the conservative side of the estimations – but 
nobody else in the industry seemed to be affected by and ease on demand.156 
In October, Panama finally started to be rolled out with advertisers gradually changing 
to the new platform. It gave advertisers a digital dashboard where they could manage their 
marketing campaigns, aim ads geographically and test their effectiveness, features that were 
already available from competition. The only significant difference to the competition was that 
Yahoo! had a “quality index” that could give advertisers a sense of how the system would rank 
an ad and guide the decision of how much to bid. The platform was intended to be flexible 
enough eventually to handle video and audio ads and to distribute ads to mobile devices, and 
that was one of the reasons it had taken so long.157  
However, only in February 2007, after all the advertisers had been moved to the new 
platform, Panama started working with the new auction method. During all the time that had 
passed, Yahoo! had been operating Overture’s original system in which results were ordered 
by bid. Google had taken the same time to improve its system to one where a supercomputer 
network of 100 machines evaluated more than a million variables in milliseconds to pick which 
ads to display with each search.158 Technologically, Yahoo! was now where Google had been 5 
years before. Financially, Google had been ahead of Yahoo! both in revenues and profits since 
2005 (see exhibits 3 and 4). 
The last year had been tough for Yahoo! with big advertisers leaving, strong 
competition and some financial problems.159 By the end of the year, Flickr, Delicious and Yahoo! 
360° were far from mainstream and Yahoo! Answers was full of rubbish.160 In October, in an 
interview to Forbes, Semel let the world find out he didn’t know the mission of the company 
he had been CEO for the past five years, and that the best he could do when trying to hide that 
was to say Yahoo!’s mission was “[to] deliver great value to its customers, and, basically, value 
them”.161 In November, one of Yahoo!’s senior vice-presidents was caught comparing the 
company’s strategy to “spreading peanut butter across the myriad of opportunities that 
continue to evolve in the online world”, in an internal memo162 that leaked out: “We want to 
do everything and be everything to everyone”, “we are reactive instead of charting an 
unwavering course”, “we are separated into silos that far too frequently don't talk to each 
other”, he pointed.  Yahoo! was “overly bureaucratic” - “there are so many people in charge 
that it's not clear if anyone is in charge - this forces decisions to be pushed up rather than 
down”, he said. “Decisions are either not made or are made when it is already too late”, “we 
are held hostage by our analysis paralysis”. 
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At the beginning of 2007 Yahoo! market capitalization was $34 billion. Google’s was 
$142 billion. Even during the peak of the dotcom bubble Yahoo! had never been as high as 
Google was now. Despite initial positive signs163, the effect of Panama didn’t last. Google now 
had years of experience in fine-tuning both its search and its advertising algorithms.164 Yahoo! 
was never able to close the gap between the two companies. (See exhibit 4) 
On June 18th, Terry Semel sent an email to the board of directors resigning and 
suggesting Jerry Yang to take his place. He said Yahoo! was “again addressing challenges 
created by dramatic changes in the needs of audiences and advertisers” and that it was “the 
time for new executive leadership, with different skills and strengths, to step in and drive the 
company to realize its full potential”.165 
Yang took Semel’s place. In February 2008, Yahoo! received a proposal to be acquired 
by Microsoft for $43 billion that was refused. Yang stepped down in November when Yahoo! 
was worth only $18 billion.166 Carol Bratz was appointed to replace Yang in January 2009. She 
entered the job saying “we are not a search company” 167, like Koogle had done 11 years 
before. In the same year, Yahoo! truly stopped being a search company when Microsoft 
became the search provider for all its websites, in a partnership against Google.168 Failing to 
present results, Bratz was abruptly fired by the company’s board in September 2011.169 A new 
CEO, Scott Thompson, took over in January 2012. By May, he was already out, amid 
controversy over his academic credentials.170 No one can predict what will happen next, but 
Forbes declared Yahoo! as already dead171 and ready to become another internet artifact.172  
  







Exhibit 1 – *Only totals available; **Includes, for instance, e-mail, classifieds, rich media and 
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4. Teaching Note 
4.1. Case synopsis 
 Yahoo! Inc. is an internet company incorporated in 1995. It started as a directory-
based search provider and gained popularity for the accurate and highly relevant results it 
presented to users at a time automated search technology had flaws. Despite being a company 
created to help people find content on the web, when it decided to base its business model on 
selling advertising, it started seeing itself not as a search company but as a media company 
and transformed its website into a Portal, to enlarge its audience. At the time Yahoo! entered 
the online advertising business, it was based on banner ads that, despite providing proved low 
return on investment to the advertisers, were a growing source of revenues due to the fact 
that internet start-ups with venture capital financing widely available were its biggest clients. 
While Yahoo! was focusing its efforts on banner advertising, other companies, like GoTo.com, 
Altavista and Google, had been turning search traffic into a source of revenue by selling search 
results as an advertising mean. Keywords advertising allowed highly targeted advertising and 
showed ads to people actively looking for related information, in a clear contrast with banner 
technology. Keywords advertising should have risen the interest of the company that led the 
online advertising business, but it didn’t - Yahoo! largely underestimated the potential of 
search and keywords advertising, failing to see how it could contribute to its own value 
creation. When the dotcom bubble burst and, with the bankruptcy of many dotcoms and the 
cut in the financing to those that remained, the demand for banner ads drastically decreased, 
Yahoo! was caught by surprise and had not developed any alternative revenue sources. 
After its first CEO was fired, Yahoo! brought in an executive with an extensive media 
background to turnaround the company. He bet on charging fees for the features and contents 
on Yahoo!’s Portal and in new advertising formats with interactive and media content – this 
would push the company further away from keywords advertising, where it should be. Only in 
2002 Yahoo! started to take actions to enter in the automated search business and develop its 
own keywords advertising technology that had always been outsourced. Its keywords 
advertising program was fully operational only at the beginning of 2007. Google, Yahoo!’s 
biggest competitor, had launched the first version of its keywords technology in 2000, and by 
2002, had improved it to be superior to any other in the market. By the end of 2007 the gap 
between Yahoo! and Google’s market value was unlikely to be closed. Yahoo! had failed both 
as a search company and as a media company since, online, those two businesses had been 
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deeply interconnected - to succeed in one was now hard without the other and Yahoo! had 
failed to see the connection.  
 After this synopsis, the teaching purpose of case is presented, followed by the instructor 
preparation section, the suggested assignment questions and a suggested teaching plan. 
Information complementary to the case and a case update are also included. 
4.2. Teaching purpose 
The teaching purpose of this case is to illustrate how the low level of dynamic 
capabilities of a firm can cause it to lose its competitive advantage when an external shock 
happens. It allows students to: 
 Evaluate the level of dynamic capabilities of a firm and understand how that impacts 
the firm’s competitive advantage 
 Identify environmental shocks and assess their effect on a company 
 Discuss how management bias and differences in opportunity templates of key 
decision makers can impact strategic decisions of a company vis-à-vis its competition 
The case aims to prepare students to use dynamic capabilities in their business 
decisions and strategic analysis throughout their life. It is written in a simple and clear manner, 
being targeted to anyone intending to learn about dynamic capabilities. However, an 
instructor might want to consider its length as a variable to decide on whether or not to apply 
it to undergraduate students. This case can be particularly suitable as an initial motivation to 
the topic as, instead of presenting a case where a company successfully applies dynamic 
capabilities, it presents an example of the dramatic impact a low level of dynamic capabilities 
can have on a firm’s performance and, consequently, why they are of the outmost importance. 
As its final outcome, this case finds the reasons behind Yahoo!’s decline as a leading 
internet company and the roots that led to the problems if faces today. 
4.3. Instructor preparation 
An instructor teaching this case may consider the need or the interest in consulting the 
materials indicated in this section to go deeper on the topics listed below: 
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 Origins, evolution and data on online advertising 
Bruner, R. E., 2005. The decade in online advertising 1994 to 2004. DoubleClick Research, 
April. Available at: 
http://static.googleusercontent.com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/www.google.com/pt-
PT//doubleclick/pdfs/DoubleClick-04-2005-The-Decade-in-Online-Advertising.pdf 
Interactive Advertising Bureau. Internet Advertising Revenue Reports 1996-Present  
Available at:  
http://www.iab.net/insights_research/industry_data_and_landscape/adrevenuereport 
 Google’s Adwords platform 
Levy, S., 2009. Secret of Googlenomics. Wired, 22 May. Available at: 
http://www.wired.com/culture/culturereviews/magazine/17-06/nep_googlenomics 
 Detailed technological functioning and history of sponsored search 
Jansen, B.J., Mullen, T., 2008. Sponsored search: an overview of the concept, history, 
and Technology. Int. J. Electronic Business, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp.114–131. 
 Search engines  current and historical news and facts 
Search Engine Watch website at http://searchenginewatch.com/ 
Search Engine Journal Website at http://www.searchenginejournal.com/ 
4.4. Suggested assignment questions 
1. What brought Yahoo!’s success to an end? 
 
 The shock that changed Yahoo!’s competitive position was the burst of the dotcom 
bubble in 2000/2001. It consisted on the realization that most of the Internet companies 
were largely overvalued, which led to the fall of their value and to subsequent cuts in 
their easy financing – which lead many into bankruptcy. This exogenous economic shock 
changed dramatically Yahoo!’s customer base (47% of its customers were “pure internet 
companies”) and drastically cut its undiversified revenues. The internet companies were 
the ones supporting the banner format as traditional advertisers had demanded more 
accountability in the online advertising since its beginning. As their financing was reduced, 
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even the dotcoms that survived the shake-out started to look for more cost efficient 
advertising formats. 
 A secondary shock that should also be considered as important to Yahoo!’s history is the 
development of the keywords advertising technology. It was developed in reaction to the 
needs of small advertisers that could not afford banner ads and to meet the need of more 
efficient and effective advertising. This was the emergence of an alternative to banner ads 
and the beginning of the democratization of online advertising. Despite providing better 
targeted ads and full accountability for its return (on a CPC basis) Yahoo! failed to 
understand the importance of this advertising model. 
 Another secondary shock that can be considered was the development of the Adwords 
Select platform by Google. This development made the keywords advertising model 
mainstream and increased its popularity. Google’s Adwords Select changed the way the 
ads were ordered when showed to the users, increasing their relevance and maximizing 
the revenue, and changed the auction method to extract more value from the advertisers’ 
willingness to pay. It consolidated Google’s position in the online advertising mean. 
2. Evaluate Yahoo!’s propensity to sense opportunities and threats.  
 
D 1 – Propensity to sense opportunities and threats: Low 
 Yahoo! systematically failed to sense the opportunity posed by search traffic and 
keywords advertising technology, and the threat coming from the decline of the banners 
advertising model 
Evidence 
 Failure to sense threats 
-Yahoo! failed to sense the dissatisfaction with banner advertising that was clear since its 
beginning - “our interest will increase when there are more sophisticated ways to measure its 
effectiveness as a marketing tool” said a representative from Coca-Cola in 1996.  “We are 
truly, truly in a research and development phase - we're learning what works, what doesn't, 
how to measure it. We don't know yet” said a representative from Procter & Gamble in the 
same year.  
-The click through rate of banner ads was between 2 to 3% when a banner was new, and would 
afterwards fall to below 1% – P&G decided to pay advertisers only on a CPC basis in 1996 
-Yahoo! failed to see how the burst of the dotcom bubble would affect its business model 
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permanently - “The Yahoo! franchise is stronger today than never before” said Koogle in 
October 2000. “This will be a transition year as we move our customer base from pure play 
internet advertisers to more traditional advertisers” said Koogle. “There is a softening of the 
economy, but we can use that to take market share from our competitors. (…) the near-term 
effect of softening economy is just that - short-term”, said Koogle in January 2001 
-There was a failure to feel the decline of directory-based search – Yahoo! only made 
automated search its primary source of search results in October 2002, despite Google being 
the top search provider in the market and Yahoo!’s secondary search results source since  
2000 
-Failure to sense the threat from Google’s Adwords Select launched in 2002– Semel 
commented that Overture’s system “was performing well, and it took time for executives to 
realize just how much better Google’s system was” 
 Failure to sense opportunities 
- Yahoo! saw no opportunity in search by considering it a commodity – It outsourced the search 
function to OpenText (1995), Altavista, Inktomi (1998) and Google (1999) 
-Lack of reaction to GoTo.com’s launch in February 1998 – Jim Gross saw the keywords search 
advertising as “revolutionary” and one that would “change the alignment of the proposition” 
for search providers. It gave small advertisers the “chance to buy space without having to 
pony up exorbitant fees for banner ads” 
-Lack of reaction to Paul Graham’s Revenue Loop presentation in 1998 – Graham was showing 
Yang “technology that extracted the maximum value from search traffic and he didn't care”, 
the Revenue Loop technology was never implemented after the acquisition of Viaweb 
-Lack of reaction to Ali Partovi’s Keywords pitch - Partovi “visited Yahoo! more than a dozen 
times to pitch the Keywords idea. (…) pitched every member of Yahoo!’s executive team 
multiple times, each time finding new ways to present the concept and new data to support 
how profitable and huge the opportunity might be, all in vain” 
-Yahoo! ignored the fact that its engineers were using Google for search and the 
recommendation to buy Google in late 1998/early 1999 – search wasn't worth worrying 
about since it was only 6% of their traffic, and they were growing at 10% a month. To David 
Filo search “wasn't worth doing better” 
-Lack of reaction at AltaVista’s entrance in keywords advertising in April 1999 – AltaVista’s CEO 
saw keywords advertising as “a rare opportunity to deliver a very good user experience, while 
generating revenues" adding that Altavista was taking the auction route to “give smaller 
businesses the opportunity to buy access to the site” 
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-Lack of reaction to Microsoft’s trial in search advertising in 2000 
-Lack of reaction to Google Adwords launch in 2000 
 
3. What factors conditioned Yahoo!’s ability to assess opportunities and threats? 
 
Several factors can be considered as part of the explanation of why Yahoo! failed to see 
the opportunity in search and keywords advertising and became overconfidence in relation to 
banner advertising (See Exhibit TN 1): 
 Initial strategic decisions - Yahoo!’s initial strategy was one of the factors that contributed 
to its decline as they drifted the company’s focus away from where it should have been:   
- Refusal to automate - as Yahoo!’s initial success was coming from its human compiled 
directory, Yahoo! rejected the inclusion of more technology in its core business and 
rejected the development of automated search technology. It decided it was not a 
technology company and started seeing technology as a commodity.  
- Advertising funded business model - as it made the decision to start selling advertising 
(it could have opted for a subscription model) it started seeing itself as a media 
company, which had as its main activity to sell advertisement and not anymore search 
providing. “What Yahoo! had been from day one was a media company” said Koogle in 
1998. 
- Portal strategy - the need to attract more viewers to support its advertising business 
made Yahoo! pursue a Portal strategy that would lead it to focus its business on 
features and content providing. Search providing, its initial way of attracting users, was 
seen as just another function on its Portal.  
 Lack of entrepreneurial culture – all these decisions impacted the culture of the company. 
Most of the internet and technology companies saw continuous technological 
development and exploitation of opportunities as fundamental to their success. In 
contrast, Yahoo! had its sales team and advertising platforms at its core, leaving 
programmers and technological development to be support structures.  
 Banner Bubble – All of the previous factors were further fuelled by the success in banner 
advertising granted by the banner bubble. This led Yahoo! to get conformed to the status 
quo, and to the belief that that source of revenue would eventually last forever. The 
abundance of demand led to overconfidence by its sales force that made it loose contact 
with advertisers and their concerns. It is important to note that, as Yahoo! considered 
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itself a media company, it should have been extremely interested in the keywords 
advertising concept, since would have allowed it to provide a better service to its 
advertising clients. 
 Organizational structure and internal problems - By 2001, Yahoo! had 44 business units 
and the decision process seemed to be concentrated on its top-decision makers - analysts 
criticised the isolation of its management team and its believe that “their way was the 
right way”. Even with only 6 divisions the structure problems would persist in 2007, when 
the VP wrote in its memo “we are separated into silos that far too frequently don't talk to 
each other” and added that decisions were forced to be “pushed up rather than down”. 
The centralization of the decision making process in the top managers and a lack of 
communication within the company might have left it more vulnerable to decision making 
bias of its top management and to the dominance of their personal opportunity templates 
that were not prepared to recognize an opportunity in search. 
 Wrong choice of Semel to CEO - The bringing in of a CEO related to media to turn around 
the company in 2001 contributed to the further missing of the opportunity as he failed to 
bring a “fresh look” into the company. This would affect the company until Semel’s exit in 
2007. 
4. Evaluate Yahoo!’s propensity to make timely and market oriented decisions and to 
change its resource base. 
 
D2  – Propensity to make timely decisions: Low  
 Yahoo! systematically failed to make decisions at a time when they could have had a 
positive impact on its performance in comparison to the competition. 
Evidence 
-Late change to automated search as primary source of search results in October 2002, despite 
Google being the top search provider in the market and its secondary search results source 
since June 2000. 
-Late actions to own automated search technology – only in December 2002 Yahoo! acquires 
Inktomi and only in February 2004 released Yahoo! Slurp. 
-Late actions to own keywords advertising technology - only in July 2003 Yahoo! acquired 
Overture when keywords advertising was already 35% of the total online advertising 
spending. Only in April 2002 Semel classified search and paid listings “key growth areas for 
Yahoo!” 
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-Slow internal decision making – Yahoo!’s executives would question the Koogle’s ability “to 
get anything done” given its consensus-style management that was slowing down the 
company’s decision making process (2000); Taking 8 months from an idea to start its 
execution Yahoo!’s process was slow in comparison to other Internet and technology 
companies; testimony from an external advisor that Yahoo! had a “relatively constipated 
process of reviewing anything”, it was slow and cumbersome (2006); testimony from a senior 
VP “Decisions are either not made or are made when it is already too late”, “we are held 
hostage by our analysis paralysis” (2006). 
 
D3 – Propensity to make market-oriented decisions:  
Since Yahoo! presented different levels of D3 at different stages of its history, the 
analysis must consider those periods separately: 
Initial period (until 1998): Medium 
 Despite the fact that part of Yahoo!’s initial advantage had its origin on the founders’ 
hobby and not in systematic decision making, Yahoo!’s initial decisions were customer 
oriented and allowed it to attract users and gain the leadership among Portals in 1998.  
 Evidence 
 Initial period (until 1998) 
-Initially focused on editorial search results to give customers the highly relevant results 
automated search couldn’t – led Yahoo! to “won the search wars” 
-Successfully implemented a portal strategy, developing features relevant to attract users –
“only one out of three users would go to Yahoo! to search” by 1998 
 
Second period (after 1998): Low 
 The initial D3 level rapidly changed and Yahoo! drifted away from what its market, both 
advertisers and users, wanted. 
 Second period (after 1998) 
-Stickiness to banners to increase market share with no regards for customers that considered 
banners inefficient or questioned online advertising - Mallet said “we ran Yahoo! to optimize 
market share", "if there was a company that didn't get it [Internet advertising], we moved on 
very quickly”; an analyst commented the management team was isolated from the market 
believing “their way was the right way” 
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-Introduction of larger, more visible ads when advertisers wanted better targeting and return 
(2001)  – Yahoo! had never done so by fear of a bad reaction from users; Google was betting 
successfully on a clean Interface since 2000 
-Introduction of fees when customers were not willing to pay – It was estimated that only 10% 
of users would be willing to pay. By 2004 Yahoo!’s fees revenue was only 13% of the total 
when the goal was 50% 
-Lack of strategic focus - accusation by a Vice President in 2006. “We want to do everything and 
be everything to everyone”, “we are reactive instead of charting an unwavering course” 
-Strategic drift to “social search” with My Web 2.0, Delicious, Yahoo! Answers, Yahoo! 360° and 
Flickr 
 
D4 – Propensity to change the firm’s resource base: Medium-Low 
Yahoo! underwent several transformations throughout its life to add services, features 
and technologies to its offer. However, according to whether those changes resulted from 
acquisitions or internal development, they should be analyzed separately and given different 
weights in the analysis of D4. Resources which have origin in internal development are not 
only potentially more significant to the success of a firm, but also tell us more about the real 
competences a company possesses to change its resource base as to acquire does not mean 
necessarily to fully integrate or transform. Despite being successful in expanding its resource 
base by acquisitions, when it came to internal development Yahoo! failed systematically.  
 Yahoo! did several acquisitions over the years, focusing on acquiring already successful 
businesses or technologies to increase its user’s base or improve its competitive position. 
However, given that Yahoo! was organized as a Portal, many of those changes to its 
resource base were simple annexations of resources, requiring little technological 
modifications and little structural integration – after bought, these services were linked to 
the portal, but their basic technology remained unaltered and they would function 
independently  from each other. Despite successful and valuable, these operations cannot 
illustrate a high propensity to change the resource base. 
Evidence 
 Acquisitions 
-Acquisition of Viaweb in 1998, converted into Yahoo! Store 
-Acquisition of Geocities in January 1999 – the Web's most popular and widely used user 




-Acquisition of Broadcast.com in April 1999 – the leading destination on the Web for audio and 
video broadcasts 
-LaunchMedia acquisition, converted into Yahoo! Music – it claimed to have the largest 
collection of music videos on the Web 
-Acquisition of HotJobs 
-Acquisition of Inktomi in December 2002 
-Acquisition of Overture in July 2003 – the best keywords advertising  technology behind 
Google 
-Acquisition of Flickr and Delicious in 2005 
 
 When it came to the internal development of functions, Yahoo! not only did it less times 
but also with far worse results.  The most important projects developed internally (those 
that were key to its survival) systematically failed to achieve their goals. When Yahoo! had 
to completely integrate and transform acquired technologies or when it had to develop a 
product from scratch, it seemed to lack the ability to do so in a way that would be 
relevant for its ability to create value. 
 
 Internal Development 
-Transformation of Yahoo! auctions, personal ads and classifieds into paid services – Successful 
but a minor change 
-Development of Yahoo! Slurp finished on February 2004 (integrating Inktomi’s technology) – 
Despite vital, was never able to compete with Google’s Page Rank algorithm 
-Development of Yahoo! 360°, Yahoo! Answers and My Web 2.0 – In spite of being seen as the 
future of search by Yahoo!, these services failed to attract users and become mainstream 
-Development of Project Panama (integrating Overture’s technology) – Started in March 2005, 
but only became fully operational in February 2007 Yahoo! – Panama aimed to compete with 
Google but did not bring any major difference from Google’s Adwords Select initial platform, 
leaving Yahoo! technologically 5 years behind Google. The project was harder than expected 
and faced problems regarding the integration of Overture’s structure. The final outcome was 
presented with a delay of 3 months and it took 4 more months for all the advertisers to be 
moved to the new platform. 
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 D1 Low  
Dynamic Capabilities Level: Low 
 D2 Low 
 D3 Low 
 D4 Medium-Low 
 
4.5. Teaching plan 
A plan for an 80 minutes presentation is suggested bellow. The analysis of the case 
should be divided in 2 parts, each one comprising the following subtopics: 




1 Environment of the search business  and Yahoo!’s initial success - 5’ 
2 Environment of the online advertising businesses and the 
development of the keywords advertising  technology 
- 10’ 
3 Analysis of D1 2 & 3 15’ 
 




4 Yahoo!’s new strategy and Analysis of D3 4 15’ 
5 Google’s technological superiority  with Adwords and Adwords 
Select 
- 5’ 
6 Yahoo!’s entrance on search and keywords and Analysis of D2 4 10’ 
7 Analysis of D4 and relationship between dimensions 4 15’ 
8 Final Remarks - 5’ 
 
Following this plan students have the chance to: 
 Gain knowledge about the environmental context of the emergence of the search 
providing business and of the online advertising business 
 Discuss the importance of management decision making biasses by critically analyzing 
the decisions initially taken by Yahoo!’s management and its implications to the future 
of the company 
 Observe the impact exogenous shocks can have in organizations 
 Understand how Yahoo! ended up in the difficult situation it faces today 
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 Gain knowledge about the events that led to the online advertising and search 
providing environments we see today 
4.6. Complementary information 
 Yahoo!’s peak in profits in the second quarter of 2005 was due to gains in the sale of 
Google shares. Of the $755 million reported, $563 million came from gains in selling 
about $1 billion in Google shares which were, in part, in possession of Yahoo! as the 
result of Google’s settlement with Overture for the patent infringement process. 
 The peak in the last quarter of 2005 was due to a low level of provisions to income 
taxes 
 The evolution of the online advertising pricing models can be found in appendix on the 
Exhibit TN 2 
4.7. Case update 
When Mr Yang took over Yahoo! he lacked executive experience, his former official 
title was “Chief Yahoo!”. His refusal of Microsoft’s deal is said to have been done more for 
personal attachment to the company he had created than for shareholder value 
considerations. Concerns and activism by some shareholders concerned with the destruction 
of shareholder value led him to step back as CEO and return to its previous position.1 
Carol Bratz was appointed CEO in January 2009. She was seen as a possible salvation to 
Yahoo! because of her tough management style.2 The outsourcing of the search function to 
Microsoft was decided aiming to cut costs and increase revenues, by cutting the investments 
in search and keywords advertising technologies.3 She was fired in September 2011, after 
being unable to turn Yahoo! around and monetize its audience in comparison with Google and 
Facebook.4 In the end of 2011, Yahoo! lost its lead in US display advertising market to 
Facebook.5 
On January 4th 2012, Scott Thompson was appointed to CEO. He had previously been 
an executive at Pay-Pal.6 On January 17th, Yang definitely left the company, leading Yahoo!’s 
                                                          
1
 Anon, 2008. Icahn’t; Yahoo!. The Economist, 26 Jul. 
2
 Anon, 2009. One tough Yahoo!. The Economist, 17 Jan. 
3
 Anon, 2009. Bingo! A deal between Microsoft and Yahoo!. The Economist, 1 Aug. 
4
 Anon, 2011. Carol out the portal. The Economist, 7Sep. 
5
 Anon, 2012. Cheerio to the chief. The Economist, 18 Jan. 
6
 Anon, 2012. Scott lands. The Economist, 5 Jan. 
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stock price to soar after the news.7 In March 2012, Yahoo! sued Facebook for several patent 
infringements in what The Economist called a “when you can’t beat them sue them” move – 
the decision was seen as desperate and come to hurt the image of the company.8 In April, Mr 
Thompson announced its strategy for Yahoo!: he would reorganize the company in three 
groups:  consumer, regions and technology.9 He would work to correct Yahoo!’s strategic 
sprawl by shutting down 50 properties, consolidate redundant technology platforms, refocus 
its media network around the core areas of sports, news, entertainment and finance, focusing 
resources on commerce-based businesses, and refocusing its R&D resources on owned-and-
operated businesses rather than on platforms that serve outside publishers.10 
On May  4th,  doubts emerged over the possibility that Scott Thompson have lied about 
its educational credentials, and was violating Yahoo!’s bylaws that prohibited him to be in 
more than one executive board of a public company (other than Yahoo!), hurting its credibility 
next to employees and investors, and further damaging the credibility of Yahoo!’s 
turnaround.11 He resigned on May 13th, leaving Yahoo! under the control of an interim CEO.12 
On May 23rd, Yahoo! announced the sale of a participation it had in the Chinese e-commerce 
firm Alibaba - this participation accounted for roughly half of Yahoo!’s market value.13 
  
                                                          
7
 Anon, 2012. Cheerio to the chief. The Economist, 18 Jan. 
8
 Anon, 2012. Making a tough job harder. The Economist, 14 Mar. 
9
 Anon, 2012. Yahoo! restructures to focus on on-line media,  social and e-commerce. Forbes, 11 Apr. 
10
 Bercovici, J., 2012. Yahoo! CEO’s turnaround plan: Do less, do it better. Forbes, 17 Apr. 
11
 Jackson, E., 2012. The time’s up for Scott Thompson and the rest of Yahoo!’s board. Forbes, 4 May 
12
 Efrati, A., Lublin, J. S., 2012. Thompson resigns as CEO of Yahoo!. The Wall Street Journal, 13 May 
13
 Anon, 2012. The long goodbye. The Economist, 21 May; Hartung, A., 2012. Core as Killer: The Demise of 
RIM, Yahoo, Dell. Forbes, 4 Apr. 
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4.8. Exhibits TN 
Exhibit TN 1 
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In the Teaching Note we showed that the failure of Yahoo! can be explained by the 
lack of dynamic capabilities. In this section, we intend to suggest how the Yahoo! case 
illustrates several aspects of the dynamic capabilities theory. 
The environment where Yahoo! operates and the time at which the main action 
unfolded, when the business models of the Internet companies were still in development, fits 
what Teece (1997; 2007) and Eisenhardt & Martin (2002) consider the ideal environment for 
dynamic capabilities to be applied, and what Zollo & Winter (2002) and Zahra et al. (2000) 
agree are the environments where dynamic capabilities may be more valuable: environments 
with a high degree of change.  
Given the characteristics of the environment, Yahoo! had all the conditions to benefit 
from developing dynamic capabilities. However, their dynamic capabilities level was low, 
raising the question of what factors might have contributed to such a situation. 
Dynamic capabilities have their foundations in an organization’s knowledge base 
(Zahra et al. 2006). Furthermore, the starting point of the creation of dynamic capabilities is 
the firm’s entrepreneurial activities that capture external knowledge as new situations arises, 
to promote organizational learning (Zahra et al. 2006). In fact, if we consider Yahoo!’s 
environment as a high-velocity environment - where dynamic capabilities rely on knowledge 
acquired as the environment changes (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000) - that starting point would 
have been of the outmost importance. At Yahoo!, that process seemed to be compromised.  
Yahoo! was presented multiple times with information showing the potential of the 
search business, the opportunity in keywords advertising and the dissatisfaction with banner 
ads. However, there was always a misclassification of those elements as not opportunities or 
not threats. Yahoo! did not fail to become exposed to relevant information – its decision 
makers consciously disregarded the information as not important in several different occasions. 
That behaviour seems consistent with the mechanism of entrepreneurial interpretation 
(Barreto 2012), by which information that is incongruent with the opportunity template of an 
entrepreneurial actor is rejected when evaluating an opportunity. As Yahoo!’s focus was away 
from the search business, its decision makers failed to interpret the information necessary to 
evaluate it as a crucial opportunity. In addition, the status quo led them to ignore the fragilities 
of the banners advertising as a threat.  Yahoo!’s decision makers’ bias impaired its propensity 
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to sense opportunities and threats compromising the starting point in the development of 
dynamic capabilities. 
However, an organization’s knowledge base is understood as the set of all that is 
known or understood by the organization and its members (Zahra et al. 2006), meaning that it 
does not include only the knowledge or the interpretation of an organization’s upper decision 
makers, but of everyone in the company. The bias of Yahoo!’s decision makers might have 
been enhanced by a broader problem that was the way information was managed and 
decisions were taken within the company. It is important to notice that signs of opportunities 
and threats, and divergent opinions regarding Yahoo!’s strategic choices did not come only 
from sources external to the organization, but also from internal sources – one can consider, 
for instance, the integration of Paul Graham into Yahoo!’s staff, the fact that Yahoo!’s 
programmers were not using Yahoo! Search or the positions of the VP in his memo. This means 
that despite the fact that the right information was within the organization’s knowledge base, 
it was not being successfully included into the decision making – fact that further 
compromised Yahoo!’s potential to have a high level of dynamic capabilities. In practical terms, 
it is the knowledge available to those who detain the decision making power and what they do 
with that knowledge that matters to the development of dynamic capabilities. 
During Koogle’s period as CEO, Yahoo! had 44 business units and analysts commented 
the insular nature of Yahoo!’s management team. By 2007, there is information that, internally, 
Yahoo! was separated into silos that did not communicate, there was a lack of accountability 
that was forcing decisions to “pushed-up”, and that the organization was overly bureaucratic 
and not an entrepreneurial culture. This points to what seems a highly centralized decision 
making process that may be the cause to why Yahoo!’s decision-makers, in addition to the 
intrinsic bias of the entrepreneurial process, were failing to integrate available information and 
failing to take advantage of the full organizational knowledge base and learning. This further 
leaves room to assume that a link between dynamic capabilities and organizational structure 
may be significant, as the organizational structure impacts the information and knowledge 
flow throughout an organization. 
This situation reinforces the benefits that can derive from formal mechanisms like 
knowledge articulation and knowledge codification (Zollo & Winter 2002) to enhance the 
organizational learning process and  to ensure that the knowledge that exists and is created 
within the firm (deriving from internal or external sources) reaches its decision makers and is 
included in their decisions.  The lack of communication and information circulation severely 
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impairs the ability of a firm to develop a high level of dynamic capabilities, as the firm will fail 
to leverage on its whole knowledge base and entrepreneurial capabilities, both when sensing 
opportunities and threats and when making decisions. 
A final topic this case succeeds to illustrate is the interrelationships between the 
individual dimensions of dynamic capabilities. As Barreto (2010) points, it is not only the 
correlation across all the dimensions that matters but also the individual variances and the 
covariances shared by some dimensions only. Yahoo! had problems regarding its propensity to 
change its resource base – the ultimate goal of dynamic capabilities. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that even if it had not, the decisions that would have driven that change in the right way were 
not done, and that those decisions were not done mainly because Yahoo! was failing to sense 
the opportunities and threats that would expose the need to make them. These relationships 
among dimensions may be particularly relevant in firms with a low level of dynamic 
capabilities, as a low score in one of the dimensions compromises the value of higher scores in 
the subsequent dimensions. For a company to have a high level of dynamic capabilities, it is 
essential that every dimension exhibits a sufficient level that allows the following dimensions 
to perform well.  
  








In conclusion, the lack of dynamic capabilities successfully explains the abrupt end of 
Yahoo!’s success. Yahoo! failed at sensing opportunities and threats and, consequently, at 
making timely and market-oriented decisions to respond to the changes in its environment. In 
addition, when it changed its resource base to react, it also failed, exposing a lower propensity 
to change its resource base than its history of continuous acquisitions would suggest. When, 
with the burst of the dotcom bubble, Yahoo!’s client base changed to one demanding more 
measurability and more effective means of online advertising, it failed to evolve in the right 
direction and became an underperformer until today. That was caused by a multitude of 
factors from bad initial strategic decisions and bias of Yahoo!’s decision makers to possible 
organizational structure and knowledge management problems. 
This dissertation illustrates how dynamic capabilities are a concept of extreme 
importance and with deep practical implications. As continuous competitive advantage 
resembles an optical illusion - as it is rather formed by a series of temporary independent 
advantages - dynamic capabilities are the lens that allows us to zoom in, and see how a 
company gradually moves from one scene of its life to the next, in what, to the naked eye, 
seems either a constant success or a sudden failure. 
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